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Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between 
internal organization and vertical integration  
Research summary. Two central issues in strategic management are the determination of 
a firm’s internal delegation and its vertical boundaries. Despite the importance of these 
issues, there is scant analysis concerning their interaction. Using a comprehensive database of 
the construction industry, we show that vertical integration positively influences the 
centralization decision and that the main mechanism driving this relationship is an 
improvement in the hierarchically coordinated adaptation of firm activities when complexity 
and uncertainty are high. We also observe that centralization is negatively related to the 
extent of relational contracts between principals and agents and positively related to an 
exogenous increase in the cost of employee layoffs. Our results suggest that managers cannot 
consider firm boundaries and internal organization to be independent decisions.  
Managerial summary. We ask whether a firm’s decision about vertically integrating or 
outsourcing its activities affects the choice of centralizing or delegating its internal decision-
making process. Our statistical analysis shows that firms with more vertical integration tend 
to centralize the decision-making process and that firms that outsource more tend to 
decentralize more. Why? Vertical integration enables the use of centralized authority to 
coordinate activities that interact intensively. Accordingly, we found that the positive 
relationship between vertical integration on centralization is especially significant in more 
complex and uncertain environments, when the need for coordination is higher. Thus, our 
results suggest that managers should choose vertical integration considering its effect on 
internal decision-making processes, particularly when coordination is important.  
INTRODUCTION 
A major body of literature within organizational economics considers the determination of 
firm internal organization. A cornerstone of this research examines the choice to centralize 
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decision-making at the top of the organization or delegate it to lower level managers (Argyres 
and Silverman, 2004; Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2013). Another major body of 
literature in this field is concerned with the determination of firm boundaries, i.e., the make-
or-buy decision (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975 and 1985). Despite the importance of these 
bodies of literature, there has been scant analysis of a possible interrelationship between 
them. This void is noteworthy because a sound theory of the firm requires an understanding 
of how internal organization and firm boundaries interact1. For instance, if delegation and 
outsourcing were complements, then for a given set of activities, we would observe either 
delegation and outsourcing or centralization and integration. A complementary relationship 
between these organizational decisions is consistent with theoretical arguments regarding the 
difficulty of integrating and then delegating (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2001) but 
contradicts popular press advice for empowerment and delegation regardless of firm 
boundaries (Foss and Klein, 2014).  
Calls to explore the internal organization and firm boundaries jointly have been issued in 
the literature (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge et al., 2007; Holmstrom, 1999; Bidwell, 2012). 
Garrouste and Saussier (2005) note, “In addition to the questions regarding the nature and 
the boundaries of the firm, the theory of the firm should also be able to cope with the question 
of internal organization.” (p. 187). Received theory is insufficient. The new property rights 
theory by Hart and Moore (1990) posits that legal ownership of assets involves complete 
centralization of decision rights, that is, vertical integration and centralization are largely 
inseparable2. In contrast, the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective indicates, 
“Substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for market failures also 
                                                 
1 A third aspect that an integrated theory of the firm should account for is heterogeneity of firm performance 
(Mahoney and Qian, 2013). We do not address this issue explicitly in our paper. 
2 Attempts to extend the property rights model to include internal organization have been made: Powell (2015) 
uses influence costs, Rajan and Zingales (1998) use ‘access to assets’ and Hart and Holsmtrom (2010) use 
‘reference points’. 
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explain failures of internal organization” (Williamson, 1973, p. 316), predicting that 
centralization and vertical integration will co-vary with transactional attributes but neglecting 
their direct mutual influence. Multitasking agency theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) 
assumes a pattern of tasks interdependence that produces a positive relationship among 
centralization of authority, vertical integration and lack of incentives. However, assuming a 
pattern limits the theory´s explanatory depth on the relationship between these three 
governance instruments. Makadok and Coff (2009) extend the multitasking model to show 
that by altering the assumed interdependence between tasks, the model can account for a 
variety of organizational forms combining different levels of centralization, vertical 
integration and incentives. However, they cannot predict which combinations are more 
prevalent. As they indicate, “[our theory] does not imply that every part of the governance 
space is populated with viable forms. Indeed, some parts of the space might be sparsely 
populated—or even empty, when the particular combination of governance elements is 
impractical, infeasible, or unstable” (p. 300).  
There is some empirical evidence that suggests a positive relationship between 
centralization (delegation) and vertical integration (outsourcing) (Withington, Pettigrew, 
Peck et al., 1999; Hong, Kueng, and Yang, 2015; Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes , 2015; 
Mcheleran, 2014; Weigelt and Miller, 2013; Arora, Belenzon and Rios, 2014; Chanson and 
Quelin, 2013). However, this evidence is correlational and thus cannot speak to whether these 
two decisions co-vary because of transaction characteristics, as TCE would predict, or 
whether there is a specific interdependence between them that would inform Makadok and 
Coff (2009)’s question regarding the feasibility of organizational forms. The distinction 
between transaction characteristics and complementarity of governance instruments is 
empirically important. For instance, Novak and Stern (2009) show that the effect of 
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complementarity in vertical integration decisions is at least as relevant as the impact of the 
transaction characteristics themselves.  
We contribute to this literature by providing a focused empirical analysis of the impact of 
vertical integration on centralization. In particular, we use appropriate instruments to evaluate 
the causal impact of vertical integration on centralization. This allows us to evaluate whether 
vertical integration correlates with centralization or whether it exerts a causal influence. By 
contrasting the impact of vertical integration on centralization with other canonical drivers 
(drawn from transaction characteristics), we can evaluate whether the interdependency is 
economically meaningful compared to these drivers. Finally, although some generalizability 
may be sacrificed, our focused approach permits us to i) provide detailed evidence that 
confirms a suggestive pattern found in previous studies, ii) distinguish the mechanisms that 
might be driving the results, and iii) spur theoretical work that is needed to develop a theory 
that jointly address firm boundaries and internal organization. 
We proceed by introducing the two main determinants of the centralization decision, 
namely, adaptation costs and agency costs. To predict the impact of vertical integration on 
centralization, we discuss how vertical integration may affect the adaptation and agency costs 
of the centralization choice. Then, we estimate the impact of vertical integration on 
centralization. To explore the mechanisms that may be driving the results, we evaluate 
whether the impact of vertical integration on centralization varies by levels of adaptation and 
agency costs.  
Our empirical setting, the construction industry, is appropriate for our study. The 
procurement of building materials is important in this industry and can be delegated to 
project managers or centralized at the corporate level. Materials procurement must be 
carefully coordinated with the various specialty trade activities that must be performed for 
each project (e.g., building and installing metallic structures, painting). These specialty trades 
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can be executed internally or outsourced to subcontractors. We explore how changes in the 
vertical integration of specialty trades affect the likelihood of materials procurement 
centralization.  
Our results show a positive impact of vertical integration of specialty trades on the 
centralization of materials procurement. This impact is stronger when coordinated adaptation 
among procurement and specialty trades is more important, which suggest that vertical 
integration enables centrally coordinated adaptation of materials procurement and specialty 
trades. More importantly, our results imply that the space of economic organization may 
indeed have a more “feasible” organizational form along with the complementarity of 
centralization (delegation) and vertical integration (outsourcing). We also found that the 
impact of vertical integration on centralization is economically important, which highlights 
the relevance of including interdependence of governance choices in our theories of the firm. 
Finally, we observe that the level of centralization of materials procurement increases with 
our measures of agency costs, namely lack of trust in project managers, distance to the 
project, and protection of workers from layoffs.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as usual. Next section covers theory 
development and hypotheses. Then, we present the setting, the data, the methods, and the 
analysis. Finally, we close with a discussion and conclusion. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The location of decision rights is a critical organizational choice (e.g., Aghion et al., 2013; 
Argyres, 1995; Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Gambardella, Panico and Valentini, 2013). 
Whereas decentralization implies the delegation of authority to managers, centralization is 
associated with the concentration of decision making, usually at the corporate level. In 
delegation, a principal with legitimate decision-making power typically grants decision-
making authority. Next, we introduce two major determinants of centralization, adaptation 
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costs and agency costs, and discuss how and through which of these determinants vertical 
integration affects centralization. 
Adaptation and centralization 
Adaptation to changing circumstances (e.g., technology, demography, environment, and 
trade) is a major organizational challenge. The existing research identifies two different types 
of adaptation. Whereas Hayek (1945) highlights the adaptation advantages of autonomous 
agents when knowledge about the choices of other agents is not required to obtain adaptive 
efficiency, Williamson (1975; 1991; 1996) highlights the advantages of hierarchically 
coordinated adaptation when activities are interdependent and require harmonized choices. In 
the former type, which we label autonomous adaptation, adaptation is achieved through local 
learning and optimization because interdependencies are not relevant, whereas in the case of 
coordinated adaptation, interdependencies must be optimized centrally to avoid inconsistent 
and non-synergistic choices. The centralization of decision-making enhances coordinated 
adaptation at the expense of autonomous adaptation; thus, the suitability of centralization 
over delegation depends on the importance of each type of adaptation to the current problem. 
A simple framework based on previous research (e.g., McElheran, 2014) captures these 
ideas. Consider a stylized firm that performs two activities executed by two different agents 
sharing the same principal. The local conditions of information as well as available 
knowledge for each activity i are represented by θi. For both activities, a decision Di must be 
made regarding the execution details of the activity. The decision-making process at the 
individual activity level can be centralized at the principal level. Alternatively, the choice can 
be decentralized at the agent level. The cost of autonomous adaptation of each activity can be 
captured by the expression αi * (Di – θi)2, where αi shows the importance of autonomous 
adaptation in activity i. If Di is close to θi, there is a high level of adaptation of the decision i 
to the state of nature. Delegation can enhance the efficiency of the decision-making process 
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because workers who hold hard-to-transfer information about local conditions and expertise 
in specific tasks solve local problems better than central managers (Jensen and Meckling, 
1995).  
In addition to the use of existing local knowledge, a second advantage of decentralization 
is that it favors the acquisition and development of new knowledge, that is, it favors learning. 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) formalize this notion. Roberts (2004) argues that decentralization 
favors internal exploration and learning from others as ways to change firm activities and to 
adapt skills to changing conditions. Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Birkinshaw et al. (2002) 
provide empirical evidence suggesting that more decentralization occurs when local learning 
is important. 
Interdependence between activities creates the need for coordinated adaptation. In our 
framework, coordinated adaptation between activities can be modeled using the expression φ 
* (D1 – D2)2, where φ captures the importance of coordinated adaptation. Prior research 
indicates that centralization can facilitate coordination of two interdependent activities 
(Alonso et al., 2013; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Zhou, 2013). Thus, absent other 
considerations, the cost structure of this stylized two-activity firm is equal to α1 * (D1 – θ1)2 + 
α2 * (D2 – θ2)2 + φ * (D1 – D2)2, where centralization is favored (disfavored) as the 
coordination of activities becomes more (less) important. 
Both types of adaptation can be affected by complexity and uncertainty, leading to an 
unclear relationship between these variables and centralization. Simon (1962) defines a 
complex system as a system “made up of a large number of parts that interact in a non-simple 
way” (p. 486). Two opposing impacts of complexity on adaptation are derived from this 
definition. On the one hand, greater complexity may lead to decentralization because firms 
engineer decomposability in response. Simon (1962) indicates that an increase in the number 
of interdependent decisions requires a design in which choices are decoupled so that they 
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may be addressed individually without requiring attention to the whole. Firms facing 
complexity may limit interactions among choices, separating them and allowing autonomous 
problem resolution, i.e., firms may design a problem structure in which α1 and α2 increase 
while φ decreases, promoting decentralization. On the other hand, greater complexity may 
lead to centralization because considerable non-decomposability may be essential to the 
problem, and interactions require coordination and careful centralized attention to avoid 
inconsistent and non-synergistic choices (McElheran, 2014; Argyres, 1995; Argyres and 
Silverman, 2004), i.e., more interactions may increase φ, promoting centralization.  
Uncertainty, which is defined as the degree of unexpected disturbance faced in a 
transaction (Tadelis and Williamson, 2013), increases both autonomous adaptation and 
coordination needs, and thus, it has an ambiguous effect on centralization. Uncertainty 
increases the likelihood of decentralization by increasing the likelihood of unexpected events, 
increasing the variance of θi and the importance of adjusting Di (Jensen and Meckling, 1995). 
Foss and Laursen (2005) provide empirical evidence that environmental uncertainty has a 
positive impact on delegation. However, depending on the covariance between θ1 and θ2, 
coordinating activities may become necessary as uncertainty increases, increasing the 
likelihood of centralization. Meagher and Wait (2013) present empirical evidence that 
uncertainty increases centralization. 
Agency costs and centralization 
The existence of asymmetric information and the impossibility of signing complete contracts 
between principals and agents lead to incentive misalignment (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In 
terms of the previous framework, D*i is the principal’s optimal choice, and the agency costs 
of each activity can be represented by σi * (Di - D*i)2, where σi captures the importance of 
incentive misalignment between principals and agents. Thus, the total cost of our stylized 
firm is represented as follows: α1 * (D1 – θ1)2 + α2 * (D2 – θ2)2 + φ * (D1 – D2)2 + σ1 * (D1 - 
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D*1)
2 + σ2 * (D2 - D*2)2. In this setup, allocating decision rights to employees increases their 
capacity to add value though autonomous adaptation at the expense of possible incentive 
misalignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1995). Consequently, when agency concerns are 
important (namely, when σi is large), centralization is more likely. 
An important factor in the determination of agency concerns is the degree of congruence 
among preferences at various levels of the firm’s organizational structure. Aghion and Tirole 
(1997) posited that delegation becomes optimal when preferences do not diverge “too much”. 
Preference congruence can be proxied by the level of trust between principals and agents. 
Bloom et al. (2012) used the generalized trust measurement from the World Values Survey to 
demonstrate that trust increases delegation. The level of preference congruence can also be 
associated with the existence of relational contracts, namely, self-enforcing informal 
agreements (Gil and Marion, 2013; Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). Companies that maintain 
a higher level of relational contracting should exhibit fewer agency problems and greater 
decentralization of their internal structures. Empirical evidence of the impact of trust and 
relational contracts on delegation beyond Bloom et al. (2012) remains elusive. 
Agency costs might also be affected by institutional change. By shaping laws and 
regulations, institutions establish the formal rules that influence the costs and benefits of the 
different organizational structures (Williamson, 2000). Changes in labor legislation that 
increase agency costs of employment can promote centralization. For example, an important 
body of literature in labor economics shows that legal changes that increase worker 
protection from dismissal decrease worker effort and increase firm agency costs (Ichino and 
Riphahn, 2005; Jacob, 2013; Martins, 2009). Agency costs are also affected by geographic 
distance because increasing distance is associated with higher monitoring costs, which has 
been shown in franchising (Perryman and Combs, 2012), entry mode of foreign direct 
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investments (Lin and Png, 2003), and bidding behavior (Gil and Marion, 2013), among other 
areas.  
Vertical integration and centralization 
The firm must decide not only whether to centralize or decentralize its internal decision-
making processes but also whether to integrate or outsource its activities (e.g., Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985; Forbes and Lederman, 2009). The mainstream theory in the analysis of 
vertical integration is TCE. Recent developments in this theory (summarized by Tadelis and 
Williamson, 2013) have returned to the early emphasis on vertical integration as a solution to 
frequent and unexpected ex post adaptation of activities through hierarchical coordination 
(Williamson, 1975). Tadelis (2009) predicted that an increase in ex post adaptation caused by 
more complex bilateral contracting leads to greater vertical integration due to the need for fiat 
and coordination of activities. Forbes and Lederman (2009) present compelling evidence for 
this view, demonstrating that airlines decrease outsourcing to regional partners in regions 
with adverse weather in which there is high need for ex post adaptation. Williamson 
summarizes this view of fiat-inducing adaptation in interdependent activities, “Some kinds of 
disturbances require coordinated responses, lest the individual parts operate at cross-
purposes or otherwise sub optimize. Failures of coordination may arise because autonomous 
parties read and react to signals differently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely 
and compatible combined response. [...] The authority relationship (fiat) has adaptive 
advantages over autonomy for transactions of a bilaterally (or multi-laterally) dependent 
kind” (1996, p.103).  
We analyze the impact of integrating an activity on the centralization of an adjacent 
activity3. In our framework, we assume that activity 2 is either exogenously outsourced to the 
market or vertically integrated into the firm and then analyze how this boundary decision 
                                                 
3 An adjacent activity uses or provides inputs for the other activity, or both require some mutual coordination. 
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affects incentives to centralize activity 1. A first mechanism to consider is that, compared to 
outsourcing, the vertical integration of activity 2 enables the hierarchically coordinated 
adaptation of activities 1 and 2 because sharing a principal facilitates their coordination. If 
activity 2 is outsourced, it becomes more autonomous, and the hierarchical direction that a 
manager can exert decreases. Essentially, if the principal wants hierarchical coordination of 
two activities, then it is better to integrate both activities so authority can be effectively used.  
Delegation can facilitate the interaction with external suppliers. As proposed by Aghion 
and Tirole (1997), delegation of authority over activity 1 motivates learning by the agent in 
charge of executing this activity, including learning the interdependencies with activity 2. 
This incremental expertise of delegation coupled with the power to react and make immediate 
decisions favors the development of mutual knowledge, trust and coordination routines 
between the agent responsible for activity 1 and the party responsible for interdependent 
activity 2. An agent 1 that is more knowledgeable about their interactions with activity 2 can 
write more complete contracts due to improved appraisals of quality, effort, and capacity to 
assess opportunistic threats from agent 2 (Mayer and Salomon, 2006). In contrast, a centrally 
managed activity 1 –detached from local details of interactions with activity 2 and with fewer 
face to face interactions– will have more difficulty creating knowledge, trust and learning 
about how to coordinate through the market and limit opportunistic behavior with external 
parties. Foss, Laursen and Pedersen (2011), Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra (2013) and Leijponen 
and Helfat (2011) show that delegation favors the use of external knowledge, providing 
evidence that decentralization of decision rights can facilitate the use of the market. 
The vertical integration of activity 2 does not affect the autonomous adaptation costs of 
activity 1 because neither the adaptation of activity 1 to local circumstances (θ1) nor the 
importance of this adaptation (α1) is affected by the governance choice of activity 2. Thus, 
vertical integration enables hierarchical coordination between activities without affecting the 
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autonomous adaptation of activity 1, suggesting that vertical integration increases 
centralization. In our framework, this prediction is stronger when the importance of aligning 
D1 and D2 is higher, that is, when φ is larger. 
Vertical integration also increases company size in terms of the number of activities 
performed internally and the number of people directly employed by the organization. This 
larger size fosters free riding among team members and increases the difficulty of mitigating 
moral hazard problems (Rasmusen and Zenger, 1990), which negatively affects the quality 
and processing of communication (Hayek, 1945) and incentivizes strategic behavior among 
employees (e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1995), increasing the likelihood of agency costs. In 
terms of our framework, vertically integrating activity 2 increase the distance between D1 and 
D*1 as well as the likelihood of centralizing that activity. This relationship should be stronger 
when the importance of aligning D1 and D
*
1 is higher, that is, when σ1 is larger.  
From this discussion, we develop hypotheses that relate firm boundaries and 
centralization. Hypothesis 1 (H1) represents our main prediction, and hypotheses 2 (H2) and 
3 (H3) predict the conditions under which H1 is more likely to be observed: 
H1: A higher level of vertical integration of an activity increases the likelihood of 
centralization of an adjacent activity 
H2: The positive impact of a higher level of vertical integration of an activity on the 
likelihood of centralization of an adjacent activity is larger when the importance of 
coordinated adaptation is higher. 
H3: The positive impact of a higher level of vertical integration of an activity on the 
likelihood of centralization of an adjacent activity is larger when the importance of agency 
costs is higher. 
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EMPIRICAL SETTING  
Construction industry 
The construction industry is an important economic actor in most countries. Typical activities 
in this industry are the following. A construction firm, also known as a contractor, builds a 
project for an owner/developer according to the specifications given by the designer. During 
the construction period, the contractor must decode and interpret the designer’s documents to 
produce a quality product. For each project, the contractor must execute specialty trade 
activities to complete the project (e.g., install electrical services). The contractor can buy 
these specialty trades in the market using subcontractors or execute them through an internal 
unit. On average, subcontractors are used 40% of the time in our setting. Subcontractors 
typically specialize in an activity with little diversification. The contractor’s main function is 
the coordination of subcontractors and internal teams to ensure timely delivery of specialty 
trade activities (Tommelein and Ballard, 1997).  
Two characteristics of construction projects are worth highlighting before addressing 
building materials procurement in detail. First, contractors can delegate decisions to project 
managers or centralize operations within their corporate centers. Agency concerns between 
the corporate center and project organization are important because monitoring is imperfect 
and must be performed on site. Approximately one-half of project coordination occurs 
through face-to-face contacts, meetings, and site visits (Chang and Shen, 2009). Second, 
although construction projects require a priori plans, schedules and specifications, it is 
common to alter these plans (Bajari, Mcmillan, and Tadelis, 2008; Sun and Meng, 2009; 
Winch, 2001). Typically, these changes are managed using change orders and account for a 
substantial portion of project cost (Sun and Meng, 2001). 
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Materials procurement 
Building materials procurement is important to project success for many reasons: i) 50–60% 
of project costs are from building materials (Turki, 2002); ii) nearly one-half of the variance 
in project schedules is explained by materials delivery timing (Turki, 2002; Ala-risku and 
Kärkkäinen, 2006); and iii) decreased labor productivity of specialty trades caused by late or 
erroneous materials deliveries is in the 20-50% range (Thomas and Sanvido, 2000). 
The process of materials procurement involves many tasks (Ellegaard and Koch, 2014). 
The procurement manager must understand and comply with the designer’s product 
specifications; coordinate the approval of any changes; solicit bids to select manufacturers; 
negotiate long-term agreements with suppliers; coordinate the fabrication of custom 
materials; schedule deliveries in coordination with the project organization; ensure quality 
control and the substitution of defective materials; and coordinate storage at the project site. 
Finally, the specialty trade´s internal team or subcontractor installs the materials.  
The contractor may centralize materials procurement activities in their central offices, 
typically in a procurement department with tight relationships with finance and project 
control departments, or delegate these activities to the project procurement manager who is 
typically supervised by the project director but reports to the procurement department of the 
contractor’s headquarters. Delegation does not imply that the headquarters’ procurement 
function disappears. Typically, when a project procurement manager is appointed, she 
assumes responsibility for management of specifications, product changes, customized 
fabrication, delivery, quality control and storage, which are more operational tasks. Although 
the project’s procurement manager may also participate in the two remaining activities, 
namely biding preparation and evaluation and long-term agreements, it is common for the 
main procurement department to retain decision rights over these tasks (Ellegaard and Koch, 
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2014). Both centralized and delegated procurement require intensive coordination with other 
project participants to ensure the proper quality and timing of materials.  
The decision to delegate procurement tasks to a project-level procurement manager is not 
trivial. In addition to the large impact on project performance, delegating procurement tasks 
may alter the incentives of the procurement function. Centralized procurement may result in 
lower prices from suppliers but typically at the expense of higher operational costs due to 
incorrect deliveries and compromised quality. If procurement tasks are delegated, incentives 
will likely be more balanced (Ellegaard and Koch, 2014): headquarters may push for lower 
prices, but the procurement manager will insist that operational efficiency not be sacrificed. 
Due to financial constraints and moral hazard concerns regarding the quality of building 
materials procured by subcontractors, contractors typically execute the bulk of materials 
procurement, allowing subcontractors to procure only small items that are not major 
determinants of project costs (Ala-Risku and Kärkkäinen, 2006; Ellegaard and Koch, 2014). 
Autonomous adaptation is the adjustment of procurement tasks to changes in conditions 
that mainly affect procurement tasks, such as materials variety, price and novelty, supplier 
availability, quality assessment technologies, and laws that regulate material requirements. 
Coordinated adaptation is the management of the interdependencies among procurement and 
related project activities. Most interdependencies are associated with the specialty trades 
activities, such as delivery timing, change order management, quality testing, and 
warehousing. Agency concerns in procurement are related to potential misalignments in 
headquarters and project level manager objectives.  
The materials procurement process is complicated by four factors that affect the 
coordination of specialty trades and procurement. First, total procurement costs are driven by 
price but also by costs incurred at the project level (e.g., storage, shrinkage, quality control, 
rework). Given that the latter are more difficult to measure than the former, contractors tend 
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to focus on the price rather than on the total cost of materials, which may lead to the delivery 
of excessive quantities of materials at non-optimal times to obtain volume discounts 
(Ellegaard and Koch, 2014). Second, storing materials at project sites is difficult: small 
spaces, traffic congestion and distributed inventories put pressure on the scheduling of 
materials delivery (Ellegaard and Koch, 2014). Third, the visibility of inventory at the project 
site and the traceability of the stock and backlog of orders from suppliers are low, leading to 
difficulties in implementing precise scheduling (Ala-risku and Kärkkäinen, 2006). Fourth, the 
specifications received at the beginning of a project tend to change during project execution, 
creating opportunistic quality downgrading (Ibbs, 1984). These four factors are particularly 
salient in complex and/or uncertain projects, increasing the importance of coordination 
between procurement and specialty trades. Complex projects typically face storage problems 
and involve more products, which hinder the definition and timing of deliveries, the 
observation of the supply chain, and the ability of subcontractors to plan capacity across 
projects. Projects that are more uncertain create more product changes and amendments in 
specialty trade tasks, increasing the difficulty of rapid coordinated adaptation to changes.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
We used a unique database provided by ONDAC S.A., a firm that collects detailed data on 
construction projects and sells these primarily to building materials manufacturers and 
distributors. The database covers the period from January 2004 to October 2012 and includes 
46,420,398 square meters built over 12,272 projects, which represents approximately 40% of 
the total square meters constructed in Chile during that period.  
For each project, we observe whether materials procurement is centralized at headquarters or 
delegated to the project and whether the contractor performs each of the following activities 
internally or relied on a subcontractor: 1) building and installing metallic structures; 2) 
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building formwork; 3) installing electrical services; 4) installing plumbing and water 
services; 5) installing heating and cooling systems; 6) building and installing windows; 7) 
painting; 8) building and installing furnishings and appliances, and 9) installing gas services. 
These activities generally account for a large proportion of construction costs (Riley et al.., 
2005). We also obtained detailed information about the subcontractor and contractor (e.g., 
executives, websites, addresses, and company names) and each project (e.g., area in square 
meters, exact geographic location, project dates, and project description). Finally, each 
project is classified as one of the following types: housing complex, office building, 
residential building, health facility, educational facility, hotel, industry, commercial project, 
religious building or single-family home. 
In construction, a significant number of small firms remain operative for only a few 
years, and according to our research and interviews with industry executives, these firms may 
behave differently. Therefore, we restricted the sample to contractors for which data were 
available for at least five years4.  
Variable measurement 
Centralization. Our dichotomous measure of centralization assumes the value 1 if the 
materials procurement process is centralized and 0 if delegated to the project level. To 
identify this, ONDAC maintains a team of employees who visit the projects to gather 
information about them. This information is sampled and crosschecked by administrative 
staff at the central office. Using this process, ONDAC determines whether procurement of 
building materials for each project is fully executed at the contractor’s headquarters or 
whether a substantial portion of the procurement activities is executed at the project level. 
Delegation requires that the project officers execute at least the following activities: 
management of specifications, coordination of customized fabrication, coordinating delivery, 
                                                 
4 However, results are robust to other cut-off criteria. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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execution of quality control, and management of materials storage. If delegation is identified, 
ONDAC collects the name and contact information of the person responsible for procurement 
at the project site. If centralization is identified, ONDAC indicates that “procurement occurs 
at headquarters” and provides the name and contact information of the chief procurement 
officer. Given that ONDAC collects this information to sell it to building material 
manufacturers and distributors, it takes great care to identify whether procurement is 
delegated or centralized and to identify the person conducting procurement for each project. 
Although our measure is unidimensional (cf. Weigelt and Miller, 2013), it captures a variety 
of procurement tasks that are of high importance to the success of the project. Figure 1 shows 
that there is considerable variation in the use of delegation among contractors. 
 [Insert figure 1 around here] 
Vertical integration. We aggregated vertical integration choices at the level of specialty 
trade activity for each project. Each of the nine specialty trades observed for a project was 
assigned the value 1 if integrated and 0 otherwise. We standardized this measure for each 
specialty trade (across all projects) and averaged this standardized measure across specialty 
trades for each project; thus, our vertical integration measure represents the standardized 
percentage of integrated specialty trade activities at the project level5. 
Adaptation costs variables. Three variables measure adaptation costs: “project size”, 
which is mainly related to project complexity; “non-housing project”, which is related to 
project complexity and design uncertainty; and “fast-track project”, which is mainly related 
to design uncertainty.  
                                                 
5 Standardization is required to aggregate information at the contractor level because there was some missing data 
at the project level (i.e., we did not observe all specialty trade activities for each project) and the average level of 
integration in each specialty trade varies. We restricted the sample to projects in which there are at least 5 specialty 
trades with make-or-buy choice data. We tested other cut-offs, and the results are unchanged (available from the 
authors upon request). 
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Project size. Large projects tend to be more complex and face more interdependencies, 
which affect governance choices (Bajari et al., 2008; Eccles, 1981). The natural logarithm of 
the project area (in square meters) measures project size. 
Non-housing project. Non-housing projects face more alterations via change orders 
(which are a type of unplanned disturbance) and are more complex than housing projects 
because they are less standardized and face more interactions (Winch, 2001). Consistent with 
this fact, housing projects are well suited to a lean construction strategy (Hook and Stehn, 
2008). We computed a dummy variable that assumes a value 0 if the project is a housing 
complex, residential building, or single family home, and 1 otherwise.  
Fast-track project. Given that the time it takes to build a project is a key determinant of 
project profitability (Winch, 2001), some projects are accelerated. This reduced time is 
achieved by relaxing the design function, so construction begins when a basic design is ready 
and details are provided in conjunction with construction activities (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 
2005). The literature identifies this fast-track strategy as the design-and-build project method 
(D&B) in contrast to the design-bid-and-build method (DBB) in which the design is 
completed before project tendering and construction. The D&B method is faster but increases 
uncertainty, unplanned disturbances, and thus the need for adaptive capacity. To avoid costly 
negotiations over changes and to align incentives, in a D&B project typically the project 
owner, designer, and contractor integrate under the same firm or coalition (Davis and Brady, 
2000). 
Given that firm governance or a costly coalition must be implemented to manage “on-the-
fly” design and construction, a D&B strategy is primarily pursued by contractors that focus 
on housing projects, which allows for repeated business over time and recovery of the costs 
of establishing a coalition (Davis and Brady, 2000). Thus, we identified a project as “fast 
track” when a housing project is built by a contractor focused on housing. In contrast, if a 
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contractor that focuses on non-housing executes a housing project, it is likely that this is a 
one-time occasion that will not allow an expensive investment in a D&B strategy. The 
division between housing and non-housing projects is observed in our data: there is 
considerable contractor focus on each of these sub-sectors; however, there is a small but non-
negligible level of crossing sub-sectors (e.g., a housing project built by a non-housing 
contractor). The combination of focus with some crossing provides the variance needed to 
identify a shift in the likelihood of managing a fast-track project.  
To obtain the fast-track variable, we first compute for each year and contractor the 
percentage of contractor volume that was executed in the housing market and then a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the project is a housing project and the contractor executes at 
least 60% of its volume in housing and 0 otherwise. This dummy captures housing projects 
built by housing-focused contractors, where the likelihood of developing a fast-track strategy 
is high. We tested various cut-offs around this value, and the results remained unchanged.  
Agency cost variables. We use three variables to measure the agency costs between a firm 
(i.e., the contractor) and management at the project level. 
Prior interactions with the project director and warehouse manager. We observe the 
name of the project director and project warehouse manager for each project. Because the 
project procurement manager must interact intensively with these two officers, a contractor 
that has developed a close relationship with them might be more confident about delegating a 
project’s procurement. We compute two dummy variables that capture prior interactions 
between the contractor executing the project and each project officer. The first assumes the 
value 1 if the project director has been the project director of any previous project for the 
contractor executing the focal project. The second dummy is analogous to the first but 
considers the project warehouse manager instead of the project director. We multiply these 
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two dummies to capture the greatest trust in delegated procurement, corresponding to prior 
interactions of the contractor with both officers.  
Changes in labor law. In March 2008, an important change in labor law dramatically 
changed the way in which labor justice informed the Chilean economy. Before the change, a 
disagreement between employers and employees, for example, regarding severance 
payments, could involve many hearings, last many years, and generate important financial 
costs for employees. The changes to the law combined the trials into one hearing, increased 
the number of labor court judges, decreased the monetary cost of trials for employees, 
weakened the legal evidence to demonstrate the existence of layoffs and created the position 
of labor defender to advice employees. These changes resulted in significantly faster trials 
and an increased percentage of cases that were decided in favor of workers. With worker-
friendlier labor laws and faster judicial processes, firms experience more difficulties firing 
workers who underperform. As it is well established in labor economics (Ichino and Riphahn, 
2005; Jacob, 2013; Martins, 2009), increasing worker protections decreases worker effort and 
increases employment agency costs.6  
These changes in labor law were implemented in phases across Chile’s 15 regions from 
the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2010. Because we control for region and year using 
dummies, this implementation allows for clean identification of the impact of the legal 
changes using difference-in-differences estimation. We observe the project start date and 
compute a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the project began after the legal 
change in each region.  
Project distance. A distant project is more difficult to monitor, impeding clear control of 
procurement activities and increasing agency costs (e.g., Perryman and Combs, 2012). 
                                                 
6 Consistent with increased agency costs of employment and prior evidence (González-Díaz et al. 1998), in 
unreported supplementary analyses, we found that the law significantly decreased vertical integration and 
increased fragmentation in the subcontractors market (i.e., more and smaller subcontractors). 
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Project distance was measured by computing the distance between a project’s region and the 
region that contains the highest percentage of total square meters built by the contractor in 
that year. We tested other measures, such as the distance between the project location and 
contractor headquarters, and our results remained unchanged. 
In the online appendix 1, we present the various control variables used in our empirical 
analysis. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for our dataset.  
[Insert table 1 around here] 
Econometric model 
We use the following econometric model to analyze the centralization of procurement: 
Centralization i,j = 0 + 1 * Adaptation Costs i,j + 2 * Agency Costs i,j + 3 * Vertical 
Integration i,j + Controls +  i,j.                                                         (1)  
The centralization of procurement executed by contractor i in project j depends on the 
adaptation costs (proxied by “project size”, “non-housing project” and “fast-track project”), 
agency costs (proxied by “prior interactions”, “change in labor law” and “project distance”) 
and degree of vertical integration of specialty trades. We expect that 2 > 0 and 3 > 0. As 
indicated in the theory section, we cannot predict the sign of 1. To explore how vertical 
integration interacts with agency and adaptation costs, we use model (2): 
Centralization i,j = 0 + 1 * Adaptation Costs i,j + 2 * Agency Costs i,j + 3 * Vertical 
Integration i,j + 4 * Adaptation Costs i,j * Vertical Integration i,j + 5 * Agency Costs i,j * 
Vertical Integration i,j + Controls +  i,j.                        (2)  
Model 2 allows us to evaluate the mechanisms through which vertical integration affects 
centralization. We expect that 4 > 0 if vertical integration has a positive impact on 
centralization by facilitating hierarchical coordination between procurement and specialty 
trades. Given that vertical integration does not affect the costs of autonomous adaptation, the 
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interaction reflects the impact of vertical integration on the costs of coordinated adaptation. 
On the contrary, we expect that 5 > 0 if vertical integration affects centralization by 
decreasing agency costs7.  
Because centralization is dichotomous, we estimate a probit model. We follow 
Wieserman and Bowen (2009) to analyze the results of probit models, particularly those 
associated with interaction terms. To account for confounding factors, we use various control 
variables and dummies for region, project type, year, and contractor. Below, we address 
endogeneity concerns related to the direction of causality between vertical integration and 
centralization.  
RESULTS  
Table 2 presents the results of the probit regressions associated with equation (1). The fit of 
the models presented in table 2 indicates that over 70% of observations are correctly 
classified and the pseudo r-square values are in the 12-21% range. The average variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of these models is 4.3, below the recommended threshold of 7 for 
multicollinearity problems.  
Models 1 and 2 present our estimations not including and including contractor fixed 
effects, respectively. Overall, the results remain robust to the inclusion of contractor 
dummies. Our main results are reported using model 2; the first column displays the 
regression coefficients, and the second displays the marginal effects. In probit models, the 
marginal effects change across observations because they depend on the covariates 
                                                 
7 Our theory and econometric model assume that efficiency in quality and costs drive procurement decisions in 
the Chilean construction industry (rather than motives such as corruption). The positive response of Chilean 
infrastructure and buildings to the magnitude 8.8 Earthquake that occurred in February 2010 supports this 
assumption. Useem et al. (2015) indicate that the level of detail, enforcement capacity and adherence to strict 
building codes were important contributors to this positive result. Institutions that are well crafted to incentivize 
efficiency and punish deviant behavior discourage contractors, subcontractors, and other players from 
opportunistically sacrificing quality or costs.  
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(Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). Thus, we computed the marginal effect for each observation 
and reported the average marginal effect. The results unfold as follows. 
None of the variables we use to measure adaptation costs is significantly correlated with 
centralization. This is not unexpected given that complexity and uncertainty increase the 
costs of both autonomous and coordinated adaptation. Consistent with our predictions, the 
three variables that measure agency costs are positive and statistically significant. First, the 
variable that measures the level of trust between contractors and project management 
indicates a negative marginal effect: the likelihood of centralization decreases by six 
percentage points (e.g., from 30% to 24%) when the project director and warehouse manager 
of the focal project both worked on prior projects with the contractor. Second, the labor law 
change has a positive marginal effect: the likelihood of centralization increases by eight 
percentage points after the legal change. Third, albeit significant only at the 85% level, we 
obtain a positive marginal effect for project distance: an increase of one standard deviation in 
the distance increases centralization by two and a half percentage points.  
We obtain a highly significant result for the effect of vertical integration on 
centralization: a one standard deviation increase in vertical integration increases the 
likelihood of centralization by four percentage points. This result strongly supports H1.  
 [Insert table 2 around here] 
Interactions of vertical integration with adaptation and agency costs  
Table 3 presents models 3 and 4, which estimate equation (2), excluding and including 
contractor dummies, respectively. These models explore the interactions of agency and 
adaptation costs with vertical integration. Models 5, 6, 7 and 8, which check for endogeneity 
bias using instrumental variables and Heckman correction, are addressed in the next section.  
Analyzing the marginal effects of interaction terms in probit models is complex because 
they not only vary in size across observations but may also vary in the direction (Wiersema 
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and Bowen, 2009). We computed the average marginal effect across observations in the 
sample using the inteff command in Stata. 
The interaction terms in model 4 reveal a clear pattern. All interactions of vertical 
integration with adaptation variables are positive and significant, whereas no interactions of 
vertical integration with agency costs are significant. Thus, our results support H2 but not H3. 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 depict our main findings. First, when vertical integration is high (i.e., mean 
plus one standard deviation), the expected likelihood of centralization increases by 5 
percentage points (from 35% to 40%) when the project is large (i.e., mean plus one standard 
deviation), whereas it decreases 4 percentage points (from approximately 32% to 28%) when 
the project is small (i.e., mean minus one standard deviation). This result is statistically 
significant at the 90% level. Second, when vertical integration is high, the expected 
likelihood of centralization of a fast-track project is 39% but only 25% if the project is not 
fast tracked. This result is significant at the 99% level. Third, when vertical integration is 
high, the expected likelihood of centralization is 48% for a non-housing project but only 30% 
for a housing project. This result is statistically significant at the 90% level8. Because 
coordinated adaptation is more valuable in projects that are more uncertain and complex (i.e., 
larger, fast-track, and non-housing), our results indicate that the impact of vertical integration 
on centralization is realized by facilitating hierarchically coordinated adaptation between 
procurement and specialty trades.  
 [Insert table 3 and figures 2, 3 and 4 around here] 
                                                 
8 The large economic significance is statistically significant only at the 90% level for two interaction terms (non-
housing and project size). The explanation for this is the high level of multicollinearity among vertical integration, 
adaptation variables, and interactions between them. For instance, the interaction between non-housing project 
and vertical integration has a VIF of 8.3. Similarly, the interaction between vertical integration and project size 
has a VIF of 39. These factors generate large standard errors and low t-tests even though the marginal effects are 
large. This high collinearity provides indirect evidence supporting H3: vertical integration and coordinated 
adaptation are intertwined in how they affect centralization. 
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Direction of influence: from vertical integration to centralization  
We have presented empirical associations in which we have assumed that causality occurs 
from vertical integration to centralization. In this section, we show that in our setting, this is 
the most likely direction of causality. It is important to advance our understanding of the 
mechanisms driving the associations between variables (Miller and Tsang, 2011), particularly 
when the analysis is conducted in specific settings, where causality can be determined with 
more confidence. However, we remain cautious in our analysis of causality, which is likely 
but not definitive. Additional research in new settings might confirm or disconfirm our 
proposed direction of causality.  
In our study, there are good reasons to think that causality does not occur from 
centralization to vertical integration. Contracts with specialty trade subcontractors are 
typically executed well before activities start because matching a subcontractor’s capacity to 
projects across location and time is a complex and consequential process in this industry 
(Bashford et al., 2003). Moreover, delays from poor capacity planning cascade down to 
specialty trade services provided later in the project (Bashford et al., 2003). In contrast, 
procurement of materials, whether centralized at headquarters or delegated to projects, does 
not require contractual commitments with independent third parties. Thus, there is more 
freedom to adjust the centralization, which can be made later along the project timeline. Our 
data indicate that the variance across projects within contractors is twice as large for 
centralization as for vertical integration, suggesting that vertical integration is stickier while 
centralization is an adjustment variable.  
Notwithstanding, we cannot a priori rule out cases in which contractors address vertical 
integration and procurement choices simultaneously, potentially creating a reverse causality 
problem. To test whether our results are driven by reverse causality, we perform an 
instrumental variable analysis using the market thinness of the subcontractor market as an 
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instrument for vertical integration. A small number of subcontractors with which to transact 
may increase the costs of using the market and promote vertical integration (Williamson, 
1985). Because centralization of procurement is unlikely to be related to the market structure 
of a specialty trade, our instrument is likely exogenous to the centralization decision.  
Because subcontractors specialize by activity and location (Somerville, 1999), the 
thinness of the subcontractor market was measured using a HHI in each specialty trade and 
geographical region. A high HHI indicates that a few subcontractors dominate the 
subcontractor market, increasing their bargaining power with contractors. The HHI was 
computed for a two-year window to avoid spurious changes. For example, the HHI for 2012 
was computed using data for the 2011-2012 period. To measure market thinness for the 
project as a whole, we averaged the HHI values across specialty trades. The pair-wise 
correlations of subcontractor market thinness with vertical integration and with centralization 
are 0.3 and 0.04, respectively, suggesting that the instrument is strong (i.e., related to vertical 
integration) and exogenous (i.e., not related to centralization).  
In Table 3, we present the results of the instrumental variable analysis. Model 5 replicates 
model 2 of Table 2. The results of a Hansen test indicate that our instrument is exogenous 
and the F-test of the first stage indicates that the instrument is strong. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test indicates that vertical integration may be treated as exogenous, suggesting that 
reverse causality does not play a role in our setting. This is consistent with the description of 
vertical integration and procurement choices presented above. Model 6 of table 3, which 
replicates model 4 of the same table, corrects for endogenous interaction terms using the 
technique suggested by Wooldridge (2002: 236-237). The results using our instrument are 
consistent: there is a statistically significant and positive interactions between vertical 
integration and adaptation.  
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Endogeneity stemming from systematic self-selection might still be obscuring our results 
(Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). Although we include an array of control variables and 
dummies, unobserved heterogeneity that might drive a systematic process of contractor self-
selection remains (e.g., project characteristics and contractor’s time-variant unobservables). 
We utilize a Heckman two-step correction to address this problem. In the first stage, we 
regressed a dummy variable for vertical integration (which took the value 1 for observations 
above the median of the continuous variable and 0 otherwise) on all model covariates, 
excluding the dummy for centralization and including subcontractor market thinness. In the 
second stage, we replicate our main regressions including the inverse Mills ratio. In model 7 
of table 3, we replicate model 2 of table 2; in model 8, we replicate model 4. The Mills ratio 
is significant, which indicates that contractors select the vertical integration and centralization 
strategies that best suit them. The results become stronger in the self-selection correction. In 
model 7, we find that the mean impact of vertical integration more than doubles the impact 
obtained in model 2. Similarly, the interaction with adaptation variables remains positive and 
significant. 
Robustness checks 
We performed several robustness checks of the results reported in tables 2 and 3. We 
summarize them briefly.  
Bargaining power in procurement (and related economies of scope). When many 
specialty trades are vertically integrated, bargaining power in procurement may increase, 
fostering centralization. We interact vertical integration with contractor market share and 
contractor size –related to market power– to evaluate whether these two variables increase 
the impact of vertical integration on centralization. However, these interaction terms were 
non-significant, and the results presented in tables 2 and 3 did not change with their 
inclusion. We also checked whether bargaining power was exerted in larger projects by 
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including an interaction between market share and project size and found non-significant 
results. These results are not surprising because contractors procure the bulk of the products 
required for a project independent of the degree of vertical integration – primarily due to 
financial constraints and moral hazard problems in quality of products bought by 
subcontractors. Thus, choosing a centralization strategy to improve bargaining power should 
be independent of vertical integration9.  
Experience in specialty trades and prior interactions with subcontractors. We estimated 
additional regressions that included controls for contractor experience in executing specialty 
trades and prior interactions with subcontractors. The former was measured as the total 
square meters internally executed by the contractor over the prior four years (from t-4 to t-1) 
versus the total square meters executed by each subcontractor in the same market and period. 
The latter was measured as the frequency of interactions between the contractor and its set of 
subcontractors during the four-year period. The results do not differ from those presented in 
tables 2 and 3. We do not included these variables in the main tables because their inclusion 
requires dropping the first half of the sample period, limiting external validity. 
The 2010 earthquake as an instrument. We used the earthquake that occurred in Chile on 
February 27th, 2010 as an alternative instrument to evaluate the sensitivity of our IV 
estimates. This magnitude 8.8 earthquake – the ninth strongest in recorded history – affected 
central Chile. We created a dummy that took the value 1 for projects executed after the 
earthquake in the regions it affected. The earthquake created a major demand expansion –
depending on the region, 5% to 20% of homes were severely damaged– promoting vertical 
integration of specialty trades because the demand shock required securing and coordinating 
supply; avoiding delays from external players induced by temporal specificity; and 
                                                 
9 Two other types of economies of scope might drive greater centralization when more trades are integrated, 
namely sharing storage and transportation across trades and projects. However, these alternative explanations 
are not likely affecting our results because i) we control for number of projects, ii) specialty trade services are 
completed sequentially, which limits resource sharing between trades.  
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controlling quality internally. In contrast, the choice to centralize procurement should not be 
affected by the earthquake10. Empirically, we confirmed that the earthquake increased 
vertical integration and did not affect centralization, corroborating its strength and validity as 
an instrument. The results using the earthquake as an instrument for the IV and Heckman 
correction models do not change from those reported in table 3, enhancing the confidence in 
our results and causal claim. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
We demonstrate that in our empirical setting, vertical integration promotes centralization. 
Although recent empirical research identifies a positive relationship between centralization 
and vertical integration (e.g., Arora et al., 2014; Weigelt and Miller, 2013) , we show that this 
relationship is not a mere correlation based on similar responses to transaction characteristics, 
as TCE suggests, but is likely causal. The impact of vertical integration on centralization is 
equivalent to the impact of other canonical drivers we measure, confirming the importance of 
our results. We also show that the impact of vertical integration on centralization is larger 
when the need for coordinated adaptation is higher and that this impact is not affected by 
agency motives, suggesting that the effect of vertical integration on centralization is driven 
by improved coordinated adaptation rather than by an attempt to control agency costs. Our 
findings are consistent with literature that shows that vertical integration not only solves 
hold-up problems but also adaptation problems (e.g., Forbes and Lederman, 2009). 
The implications of our findings are important for economic organization. First, internal 
organization may not be determined independently of firm boundaries. This result is 
                                                 
10 The nature of the coordination between trades and procurement remains unchanged, and because building 
material suppliers are nationwide players, both inventory (level and variety) and prices in the regions affected by 
the earthquake should not differ from the prices and inventory in the rest of the country. Thus, neither coordinated 
nor autonomous adaptation changed importantly. For agency costs, the effects may offset each other. On the one 
hand, a larger future volume may increase (calculative) trust, promoting delegation; on the other hand, a larger 
volume is harder to monitor and may promote economies of scale in price, increasing centralization. 
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consistent with recent calls for a more comprehensive theory of the firm that connects 
internal organization to external firm boundaries (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005; Holmstrom, 
1999; Bidwell, 2012). Second, positive interdependency between vertical integration and 
centralization suggests that firms are not equally distributed on the governance space 
surveyed by Makadok and Coff (2009); organizational forms may concentrate around two 
configurations: centralized firms with vertically integrated hierarchies and decentralized 
firms with higher levels of outsourcing. This does not imply that other organizational forms 
do not occur; they may simply occur less frequently. This pattern is consistent with extant 
research that suggests that a decentralized but vertically integrated hierarchy might be very 
difficult to attain (Baker et al., 2001). 
Our micro-level data also contributes to the relatively thin empirical literature exploring 
the determinants of centralization decisions. We show that firms tend to decentralize when 
the managers at the project level have more prior interactions with the company corporate 
center, probably because of relational contracting and trust. In a result that is consistent with 
the work of theorists who have analyzed the relationship between firm organization and the 
external environment (e.g., Williamson, 2000), we also observe that institutional variables are 
relevant to the centralization choice. 
Beyond possible generalization of our results to other industries in which there are similar 
adaptation costs, agency problems, and centralization and vertical integration decisions (e.g., 
other project-based sectors, such as capital goods), we believe that our findings might extend 
to other procurement settings. For example, multi-establishment manufacturing firms must 
decide whether to procure raw materials locally at the plant or at the headquarter level in a 
setting where the level of vertical integration or outsourcing of different activities for each 
plant must also be decided. Our findings may also relate to the management of 
multidivisional firms, where delegation of decision rights to divisions would be accompanied 
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by a much more “market-like” interaction between these divisions (i.e., transfer prices that 
match the market, autonomy to substitute the internal supplier with an external supplier). This 
is found in the TCE literature on divisional transfer price policy (Shelanski, 2004; Poppo, 
2003). However, this literature, in contrast to our framework, studies covariance to 
transaction attributes and does not explore the interdependency among centralization and the 
type of relationship between divisions.  
Based on our results, we can envision several avenues for further research relating 
organizational features and firm boundaries. First, additional empirical analysis is warranted. 
In addition to tests of this relationship in different settings, empirical studies should also 
address the reverse relationship that we do not address, namely, how internal organization may 
affect vertical integration (e.g., Weigelt and Miller, 2013; Bidwell, 2012). Second, an 
understanding of the dynamics of the optimization of each of these decisions and of their links 
is needed. Changes in either internal organization features or firm’s boundaries are not 
instantaneous and present different levels of rigidities. For instance, a change in external 
conditions suggesting a move from integration to outsourcing may not be advisable if 
decentralization is highly complementarity with outsourcing and the centralization decision is 
costly to reverse. Third, further research to deepen the theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between vertical boundaries and internal firm organization is needed. Theoretical models have 
been developed in both areas, but attempts to analyze and explain their interaction might be 
fruitful. A recent example of such an effort is Powell (2015) whose model yields results 
consistent with ours. Finally, we believe that the relationship between formal organizational 
structure –of which firm boundaries is an important part– and informal organization –trust, 
cooperation, culture, and social norms– has been understudied, probably because of its 
complexity. We encourage researchers to address this important issue. Prior work on (formal 
v/s informal) inter-organizational relations can serve as an inspiration. Also, the view of 
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Makadok and Coff (2009) is both intriguing and exciting: formal structure is essentially a way 
to foster cooperation. The latter might carry more weight on performance than adjusting the 
former to transaction characteristics.   
There are several limitations to our study. First, we use a one-dimensional measure of 
delegation and centralization, while other studies typically develop measures of delegation in 
a variety of decision rights rather than procurement alone. Second, given that the construction 
industry tends to be local and specific to the country context, caution should be exercised in 
generalizing our findings. Third, although our instrumental variable and institutional details 
helps in the identification of causality, any causal claim should be treated cautiously. Fourth, 
our measures of complexity and uncertainty are not unequivocally related to each construct. 
In sum, we believe that the joint analysis of internal firm organization and vertical 
boundaries provides important pieces and motivation for developing a more comprehensive 
theory of the firm. This endeavor is important and worthwhile: after all, a proper theory of 
the firm should appropriately integrate firm boundaries and internal organization.  
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Lelarge, C., Van Reenen, J., Zilibotti, F. 2007. Technology, 
Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 122(4), 1759-1799. 
Aghion, P., Tirole, J. 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of political 
economy, 105(1): 1-29. 
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J.  2013. Incomplete Contracts and the Internal 
Organization of Firms, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (advance access) 
doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewt003. 
Ala-Risku, T., Kärkkäinen 2006. Material delivery problems in construction projects: a 
possible solution. International Journal of Production Economics, 104: 19-29. 
Alonso, J., Clifton J., Díaz-Fuentes, D. 2015. Did New Public Management Matter? An 
empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on public sector size, 
Public Management Review, 17(5):643-660 
Alonso, R., Dessein, W., Matouschek, N. 2013. Organizing to adapt and compete. Working 
paper. http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~vralonso/OTAC_April2013.pdf 
Argyres, N. S. 1995. Technology strategy, governance structure and interdivisional 
coordination. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,28(3): 337-358. 
Argyres, N., Silverman, B. S. 2004. R&D, organization structure, and the development of 
corporate technological knowledge. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9): 929-958 
34 
 
Arora, A., Belenzon, S., Rios, L. A. 2014, Make, buy, organize: The interplay between 
research, external knowledge, and firm structure. Strategic Management Journal, 
35(3): 317-337. 
Bajari, P., Mcmillan, R., Tadelis, S. 2008. Auctions versus negotiations in procurement: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 25(2): 372-399. 
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. 2001. Bringing the market inside the firm?  American 
Economic Review, 212-218. 
Bashford H, Sawhney A, Walsh K, Hot K. 2003. Implications of even flow production 
methodology for US housing industry. Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management 129(3): 330–337. 
Bidwell, M. J. 2012. Politics and firm boundaries: How organizational structure, group 
interests, and resources affect outsourcing. Organization Science, 23(6): 1622-1642. 
Birkinshaw, J., Nobel, R., & Ridderstråle, J. 2002. Knowledge as a contingency variable: do 
the characteristics of knowledge predict organization structure?. Organization 
science, 13(3): 274-289 
Bloom, N., R. Sadun, and J. Van Reenen. 2012. The Organization of Firms Across Countries, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1663-1705. 
Cacciatori, E., Jacobides, M.G. 2005. The dynamic limits of specialization: vertical 
integration reconsidered. Organization Studies, 26(12): 1851-1883 
Chang, A. and F. Shen 2009, ‘Coordination needs and supply of construction projects,’ 
Engineering Management Journal, 21(4), 44–57. 
Chanson, G., Quelin, B. V. 2013. Decentralization and contracting out: A new pattern for 
internal and external boundaries of the firm. European Management Journal, 31(6), 602-
612. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16): 386-405.  
Davies, A., Brady T.  2000, Organizational capabilities and learning in complex product 
system: towards repeatable solutions, Research Policy, 29: 931–953. 
Eccles, R. G. 1981, ‘The quasi-firm in the construction industry,’ Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 2(4), 335–357. 
Ellegaard, C., Koch, C. 2014. A model of functional integration and conflict: The case of 
purchasing-production in a construction company, International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 34(3):.325 - 346 
Forbes, J.,Lederman, M. 2009. Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline 
Industry. American Economic Review, 99(5): 1831-49. 
Foss, N. J., Laursen, K. 2005. Performance pay, delegation and multitasking under 
uncertainty and innovativeness: An empirical investigation. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 58(2): 246-276. 
Foss, N. J., Laursen, K., & Pedersen, T. 2011. Linking customer interaction and innovation: 
The mediating role of new organizational practices. Organization Science, 22(4): 980-
999. 
Foss, N. J., Lyngsie, J., Zahra, S. A. (2013). The role of external knowledge sources and 
organizational design in the process of opportunity exploitation. Strategic Management 
Journal, 34(12): 1453-1471. 
Foss, N., Klein, P. 2014. Why managers still matter. Sloan Management Review, Fall 2014 
Gambardella, A., Panico, C. and Valentini, G. 2013. Strategic incentives to human capital. 
Strategic Management Journal, advance access, doi: 10.1002/smj.2200 
Garrouste, P., Saussier, S. 2005. Looking for a theory of the firm: future challenges. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 58(2): 178-199 
35 
 
Gil, R., Marion, J. 2013. Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence 
from California Highway Procurement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
29(2): 239-277. 
Gibbons, R., Henderson, R. 2012. Relational contracts and organizational capabilities. 
Organization Science, 23(5): 1350-1364. 
González-Díaz, M, Arruñada, B., Fernández, A. 1998, Regulation as cause of firm 
fragmentation: The case of the spanish construction industry, International Review of 
Law and Economics, 18(4): 433-450. 
Hamilton, B. H., Nickerson, J. A. 2003. Correcting for endogeneity in strategic management 
research. Strategic organization, 1(1): 51-78. 
Hart, O., Moore, J. 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of political 
economy, 1119-1158. 
Hart, O., & Holmstrom, B. 2010. A theory of firm scope. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 125(2). 
Hayek, F. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35, 519-
530. 
Holmstrom, B. 1999. The firm as a subeconomy. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
organization, 15(1): 74-102. 
Hong, B., Kueng, L., Yang, M. 2015. Estimating Management Practice Complementarity 
between Decentralization and Performance Pay. NBER working paper No. 20845 
Hook M, Stehn L. 2008. Applicability of lean principles and practices in industrialized 
housing production. Construction Management and Economics 26(10): 1091–1100. 
Ibss, W. 1986. “Brand name or equal” product specifications, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management. 112(1): 1-13. 
Ichino, A., Riphahn, R. T. 2005. The effect of employment protection on worker effort: 
Absenteeism during and after probation. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 3(1): 120-143. 
Jacob, B. A. 2013. The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 31(4), 727-761. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W. H. 1995. Specific and general knowledge, and organizational 
structure. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8(2): 4-18. 
Lin, C., Png, I. 2003. Monitoring costs and the mode of international investment, Journal of 
Economic Geography, 3(3): 261-274. 
Leiponen, A.,  Helfat, C. E. 2011. Location, decentralization, and knowledge sources for 
innovation. Organization Science, 22(3): 641-658 
Mahoney, J. T., Qian, L. 2013. Market frictions as building blocks of an organizational 
economics approach to strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 34(9): 
1019-1041 
Makadok, R.,  Coff, R. 2009. Both market and hierarchy: An incentive-system theory of 
hybrid governance forms. Academy of Management Review,34(2): 297-319. 
Martins, P. S. 2009. Dismissals for cause: The difference that just eight paragraphs can 
make. Journal of Labor Economics, 27(2), 257-279. 
Mayer, K. J., Salomon, R. M. 2006. Capabilities, contractual hazards, and governance: 
Integrating resource-based and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49(5): 942-959. 
McAffee, R., McMillan, J., 1995. Organizational diseconomies of scale. Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 4 (3), 399–426. 
McElheran, K. 2014. Delegation in multi-establishment firms: Evidence from I.T. 
purchasing. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 23(2): 225-258. 
36 
 
Meagher, K. J., Wait, A. 2013. Delegation of Decisions About Change in Organizations: The 
Roles of Competition, Trade, Uncertainty, and Scale. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewt011  
Miller, K. D., Tsang, E. W. 2011. Testing management theories: critical realist philosophy 
and research methods. Strategic Management Journal, 32(2): 139-158. 
Nickerson, J., Zenger T. 2004. A knowledge-based theory of the firm – The problem solving 
perspective. Organization Science 15(6): 617-632. 
Novak, S., Stern, S. 2009. Complementarity among vertical integration decisions: Evidence 
from automobile product development. Management Science, 55(2): 311-332 
Perryman, A., Combs, J. G. 2012, Who should own it? An agency-based explanation for 
multi-outlet ownership and co-location in plural form franchising. Strategic Management 
Journal, 33: 368–386.  
Poppo, L. 2003. The Visible Hands of Hierarchy within the M‐Form: An Empirical Test of 
Corporate Parenting of Internal Product Exchanges. Journal of Management 
Studies, 40(2): 403-430 
Poppo, L., Zhou, K., Ryu, S. 2008. Alternative Origins to Interorganizational Trust: An 
Interdependence Perspective on the Shadow of the Past and the Shadow of the Future, 
Organization Science 19(1): 39-55. 
Powell, M. 2015. An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm 
Boundaries. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Advance internet access 
Rajan, R. G., Zingales, L. 1998. Power in a Theory of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 387-432 
Rasmusen, E., Zenger, T.R., 1990. Diseconomies of scale in employment contracts. Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1), 65–92. 
Riley, D., Varadan, P., James, J., Thomas, R.,  2005. Benefit-cost metrics for design 
coordination of mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems in multistory buildings, 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 131(8): 877-889 
Roberts, J. 2004. The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth. 
Oxford University Press, New York.  
Shelanski, H. A. 2004. Transaction-level determinants of transfer-pricing policy: evidence 
from the high-technology sector. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(6): 953-966. 
Simon, H. 1962 The architecture of complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society. 106, 467-482 
Somerville, C. 1999. The industrial organization of housing supply: market activity, land 
supply and the size of the homebuilder firms. Real Estate Economics 27(4): 669-694. 
Sun M, Meng X. 2009. Taxonomy for change causes and effects in construction projects. 
International Journal of Project Management 27(6): 560–572. 
Tadelis, S. 2009. Complexity, flexibility and the make or buy decision. American Economic 
Review  92(papers and proceedings): 433-437. 
Tadelis, S., Williamson, O.E. 2013. Transaction Cost Economics. The Handbook of 
Organizational Economics, chapter 3. Editors: Robert Gibbons and John Roberts. 
Princeton University Press. 
Thommas, R., Sanvido, V. 2000. The role of the fabricator in labor productivity. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 126(5): 358-365. 
Tommelein I, Ballard G. 1997. Coordinating specialists. Technical report no. 97-8: Civil and 
Environmental Engineering Department, University of California: Berkeley, CA. 
Turki Ibn-Homaid N. 2002 A comparative evaluation of construction and manufacturing 
materials management. International Journal of Project Management 20: 263-270. 
Useem, M., Kunreuther, H., Michel-kerjan, E. 2015 Leadership dispatches: Chile's 
extraordinary comeback from disaster. Stanford University Press 
37 
 
Weigelt, C., Miller, D. J. 2013, Implications of internal organization structure for firm 
boundaries. Strategic Management Journal, 34(12): 1411–1434. 
Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., Peck, S., Fenton, E., Conyon, M. 1999. Change and 
complementarities in the new competitive landscape: a European panel study, 1992–
1996. Organization Science, 10(5): 583-600 
Wieserman M, Bowen H. 2009. The use of limited dependent variable techniques in strategy 
research: issues and methods. Strategic Management Journal 30(6): 679–692. 
Winch, G.M., 2001. Governing the project process: a conceptual framework. Construction 
Management and Economics 19, 799–808. 
Williamson, O. E. 1973. Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations. The 
American economic review, 316-325 
Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications. The 
Free Press, New York 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York. 
Williamson, O.E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press. New 
York, NY. 
Williamson, O. E. 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking 
ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3): 595-613. 
Wooldridge J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Zhou. Y.M. 2013. Designing for Complexity: Using Divisions and Hierarchy to Manage 
Complex Tasks, Organization Science, 24(2): 339-355. 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1. Histogram of average centralization by 
contractors. 
 
Figure 2. Impact of the interaction between 
vertical integration and project size  
 
Figure 3. Impact of the interaction between vertical 
integration and fast track projects  
Figure 4. Impact of the interaction between 
vertical integration and non-housing projects  
0
5
10
15
20
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
C
o
n
tr
a
c
to
rs
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Average centralization of procurement by contractors
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Mean Vertical
Integration -
1SD
Mean Vertical
Integration
Mean Vertical
Integration +
1SD
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 
o
f 
C
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
Mean Project Size - 1SD
Mean Project Size + 1SD
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Mean Vertical
Integration - 1SD
Mean Vertical
Integration
Mean Vertical
Integration +
1SD
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 
o
f 
C
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
Not Fast track project
Fast track project
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Mean Vertical
Integration -
1SD
Mean Vertical
Integration
Mean Vertical
Integration +
1SD
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 
o
f 
C
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
o
n
Housing Project
Non-Housing Project
 38 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Centralization 1 
                 
2 Vertical integration 0.03 1 
                
3 Project size 0.05 -0.45 1 
               
4 Fast track project 0.01 0.01 0.02 1 
              
5 Non-housing project -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.86 1 
             
6 Prior interactions PD & WM -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 1 
            
7 Change in labor justice 0.01 0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.10 0.12 1 
           
8 Project distance 0.13 0.14 0.08 -0.07 0.09 -0.06 0.11 1 
          
9 Number of projects of contractor -0.02 -0.08 0.14 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.20 1 
         
10 1st quintile of contractor size 0.06 0.11 -0.39 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.12 -0.30 1 
        
11 2nd quintile of contractor size 0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.30 -0.17 1 
       
12 3rd quintile of contractor size 0.06 -0.13 0.18 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 1 
      
13 4th quintile of contractor size 0.04 -0.15 0.24 0.07 -0.10 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 1 
     
14 5th quintile of contractor size -0.14 0.18 -0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.64 -0.31 -0.32 -0.34 -0.35 1 
    
15 Contractor market share 0.09 0.14 0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.22 0.32 -0.27 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 0.34 1 
   
16 Contractor diversification -0.03 -0.22 0.12 -0.43 0.26 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.38 -0.24 -0.17 -0.01 0.11 0.27 0.05 1 
  
17 Geographical dispersion of 
contractor 
0.07 0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.42 0.50 -0.25 -0.21 -0.05 0.18 0.30 0.33 0.28 1 
 
18 Volume uncertainty 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.46 -0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.13 0.02 0.07 1 
  
                 
 
 
Observations 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 
 
Mean 0.34 -0.34 8.54 0.70 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.41 5.72 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.04 0.24 0.19 47.68 
 
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.60 1.60 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.43 1.06 4.70 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.06 0.24 0.25 25.99 
 
Min 0.00 -1.30 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5E-06 0.00 0.00 0.17 
 
Max 1.00 1.26 13.21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.00 29.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.79 0.75 86.06 
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Table 2. Probit regression results (without interaction effects) 
 Dependent variable: Centralization of material procurement 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Method: Probit Probit 
 
Variables: 
Coefficient Average Marginal 
Effect (AME) 
Coefficient AME 
Vertical integration 0.203 *** 0.065 *** 0.222 *** 0.063 *** 
 (0.059) (0.018) (0.078) (0.022) 
Adaptation variables:     
Project size 0.007 0.002 0.014 0.004 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.029) (0.008) 
Fast track project -0.005 -0.001 -0.055 -0.015 
 (0.128) (0.041) (0.160) (0.045) 
Non-housing project 0.040 0.013 -0.176 -0.050 
 (0.295) (0.094) (0.335) (0.095) 
Agency variables:     
Prior interactions PD & WM -0.228 *** -0.073 *** -0.208 ** -0.059 ** 
 (0.083) (0.026) (0.091) (0.026) 
Change in labor justice 0.188  0.060 0.272 * 0.077 * 
 (0.139) (0.044) (0.153) (0.043) 
Project distance -0.002 -0.001 0.082 † 0.023 † 
 (0.036) (0.011) (0.052)  (0.015) 
Control variables:     
Number of projects of contractor 0.006 0.002 0.013 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004) 
1st quintile of contractor size 0.634 *** 0.203*** 0.584 ** 0.166** 
 (0.183) (0.058) (0.259) (0.073) 
2nd quintile of contractor size 0.444 *** 0.014*** 0.238 0.068 
 (0.145) (0.046) (0.200) (0.057) 
3rd quintile of contractor size 0.339 *** 0.108*** 0.249 0.071† 
 (0.125) (0.040) (0.170) (0.048) 
4th quintile of contractor size 0.245 ** 0.078** 0.146 0.041 
 (0.105) (0.033) (0.143) (0.040) 
5th quintile of contractor size Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
     
Contractor market share 1.200 † 0.384 -0.499 -0.142 
 (0.746) (0.238) (1.014) (0.289) 
Contractor diversification -0.042 -0.013 0.240 0.068 
 (0.163) (0.052) (0.224) (0.064) 
Geographical dispersion of 
contractor 
0.182 0.058 0.069 0.019 
 (0.161) (0.051) (0.256) (0.073) 
Volume uncertainty 0.006 ** 0.002** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) 
Type of project, year and region 
dummies? 
Yes  Yes  
Contractor dummies? No  Yes  
Constant -2.44 ***  -3.90 ***  
 (0.598)  (0.572)  
     
Observations 2135  2135  
Percentage correctly classified 71.52%  74.10%  
Pseudo R-Square 12.04%  21.41%  
† 15% significance, * 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance // Robust standard errors in parentheses // Delta 
method standard errors in AME 
 
Table 3. Probit regression results (including interaction terms, Instrumental Variables 
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(IV) regressions and Heckman correction regressions). 
 Dependent variable: Centralization of material procurement 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Method: Probit Probit IV - 2SLS IV- 2SLS Heckman Correction, 2nd 
Stage, Probit 
Variables: Coefficient AME Coefficient AME Coefficient Coefficient AME AME 
Vertical integration -1.186 *** -0.377 *** -1.075 *** -0.304 *** -0.065 -0.60 ** 0.148*** -0.222† 
 (0.388) (0.122) (0.449) (0.126) (0.157) (0.263) (0.034) (0.153) 
Project size 0.047 †  0.015 *  0.040 0.011 0.001 0.010 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.029) (0.009) (0.032) (0.009) (0.10) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Fast track project 0.251 0.080 † 0.321 0.091 -0.017 0.111 -0.048 0.065 
 (0.196) (0.062) (0.233) (0.066) (0.043) (0.080) (0.046) (0.080) 
Non-housing project 0.317 0.100 0.174 0.049 -0.064 0.070 -0.034 0.087 
 (0.330) (0.104) (0.388) (0.110) (0.105) (0.129) (0.096) (0.117) 
Prior int. with PD & WM -0.209 ** -0.066 ** -0.189 * -0.053 *  -0.059** -0.038 -0.066** -0.087** 
 (0.097) (0.030) (0.107) (0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.039) 
Change in labor justice 0.173 0.055 0.272 * 0.077 * 0.071† 0.076 0.099** 0.070 
 (0.144) (0.045) (0.159) (0.045)  (0.050) (0.059) (0.047) (0.053) 
Project distance -0.014 -0.004 0.073 0.020 0.026† 0.031* 0.025* 0.023† 
 (0.037) (0.011) (0.053) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Interaction effects:         
Vertical integration X  
Project size 
0.121 *** 0.038 *** 0.077 * 0.021 *  0.031*  0.024* 
 (0.036) (0.011) (0.043) (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.013) 
Vertical integration X  
Fast track project 
0.452 * 0.143 * 0.730 *** 0.206 ***  0.247**  0.184* 
 (0.248) (0.078) (0.288) (0.081)  (0.106)  (0.099) 
Vertical integration X  
Non-housing project 
0.295 0.093 0.488 * 0.138 *   0.179†  0.159† 
 (0.268) (0.085) (0.296) (0.076)  (0.125)  (0.104) 
Vertical integration X  
Prior interactions with PD 
& WM 
0.063 0.020 0.058 0.016  0.063  -0.040 
 (0.149) (0.047) (0.164) (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.057) 
Vertical integration X  
Change in labor justice 
-0.092 -0.029 -0.070 -0.020  -0.005  -0.080 † 
 (0.130) (0.041) (0.145) (0.041)  (0.075)  (0.052) 
Vertical integration X  
Project distance 
-0.014 -0.004  0.032 0.009  0.047*  0.004 
 (0.049) (0.015) (0.059) (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.017) 
Inverse Mills Ratio       0.071*** 0.065*** 
       (0.021) (0.021) 
Control variables? Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of project, year and 
region dummies? 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contractor dummies? No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instrument for vertical 
integration? 
    Market Thinness of Specialty Trades’ Subcontractors 
Constant -3.071 ***  -4.391 ***  -0.536*** -0.700***   
 (0.629)  (0.889)  (0.201) (0.216)   
Observations 2135  2135 2135 2135 2135 1777 1777 
% correctly classified 71.33%  74.80%    75.01% 75.58% 
[Pseudo] R-Square  [12.72%]  [21.87%]  23.16% 23.11% 23.05% 23.56% 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(p-value) 
    0.40 (0.70)    
Hansen-test (p-value)     0.24(0.6) †    
F-test First Stage     2807    
† 85% significance, * 90% significance, ** 95% significance, *** 99% significance // Robust standard errors in parentheses // Delta method standard 
errors in AME // † We added a 2nd instrument to compute the Hansen test (with only 1 instrument the equation is exactly identified). We selected from 
Model 2 “Geographical dispersion of contractor”, which is not correlated with centralization. The strength of the combined instruments (F test First 
Stage) decreased but remained high and valid. 
 
